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How attention scarcity effects the outcomes of a game? We present our ﬁndings on a version of the Iterated
Prisoners Dilemma (IPD) game in which players can accept or refuse to play with their partner. We study the
memory size effect on determining the right partner to interact with. We investigate the conditions under which
the cooperators are more likely to be advantageous than the defectors. This work demonstrates that, in order
to beat defection, players do not need a full memorization of each action of all opponents. There exists a critical
attention capacity threshold to beat defectors. This threshold depends not only on the ratio of the defectors in
the population but also on the attention allocation strategy of the players.
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1. Introduction
Games and economic models are more interrelated than one can imagine [1]. This is also the case for
social interactions. A simplistic virtual setting for simulating a trust in an e-commerce setting, would be
the Iterated Prisoners Dilemma game which is, by its nature, very related to the evolution of a trust [2, 3].
Each transaction in an e-commerce setting can be viewed as a round in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma
game. Adherence to electronic contracts or providing services with good quality can be considered as
cooperation while the temptation to act deceptively for immediate gain can be considered as deception.
Economy is the study of how to allocate scarce resources. According to Davenport, the scarcest re-
source of today is nothing but attention [4]. Attention scarcity is ﬁrst stated by Herbert Simon. He says
that, “What information consumes is rather obvious: it consumes the attention of its recipients” [5]. The
new digital age has come with its vast amount of immediately available information that exceeds our
information processing power. Thus, attention scarcity is a natural consequence of huge amount of in-
formation. Attention is very critical to any kind of interaction, especially in the era of digital technologies.
Conventional Economy has been transforming itself to the Attention Economy [4, 6–8]. Games should do
the same. Little work has been done on games with limited attention. How does attention scarcity effect
a game? We will discuss attention games in a speciﬁc context of Iterated Prisoners Dilemma.
1.1. Iterated Prisoners Dilemma game
Prisoners Dilemma game is one of the commonly studied social experiments [2, 3, 9–12]. Two players
should simultaneously select one of the two actions: cooperation or defection, and play accordingly with
each other. Dependent on their choices, they receive different payoffs as seen in ﬁgure 1.
Payoff matrix can be described by the following simple rules. In the case of mutual cooperation,
both players receive the reward payoff, R. If one cooperates, while the other defects, cooperator gets the
sucker’s payoff, S while the defector gets temptation payoff, T . In the case of mutual defection, both get
the punishment payoff P . Payoff matrix should satisfy the inequality S < P < R < T and the additional
constraint T +S < 2R for repeated interactions. Rationality leads to defection, because R < T and S < P
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Cooperate Defect
Cooperate R, R S, T
Defect T , S P , P
Figure 1. Payoff matrix. We use T = 5, R = 3, P = 1, and S = 0.
makes defection better than cooperation. But, at the same time, P < R implies that mutual cooperation is
superior to mutual defection. So, rationality fails and this situation is referred to as a dilemma.
It is well known that the defection is the individually reasonable behavior that leads to a situation in
which everyone is worse off [2]. On the other hand, cooperation results in the maximization of the joint
outcomes [11].
If two players play prisoners dilemma more than once and they remember previous actions of their
opponent and change their strategy accordingly, the game is called Iterated Prisoners Dilemma (IPD) [12].
Despite its level of abstraction, a large variety of situations starting from daily life (i.e., stop or go on
when the red light is on?) to socio-economic relations (i.e., fulﬁll or renege on trade obligations?) may be
represented as an IPD game. It is shown that repeated encounters between the same individuals foster
cooperation. This is often referred to as the shadow of the future. If individuals are likely to interact again
in the future, this allows for the return of an altruistic act [2, 10].
1.2. Attention in games
In general, a player is not capable of knowing all the players in an interacting environment and usu-
ally acts based on a limited information. One reason could be the huge number of players, or another
could be that the players may have a very limited memory size to be informed of all the others [13, 14].
For example, in real life, a market has a few market leaders and many small brands whose number, in
general, is simply too large for consumer to remember all of them. Therefore, a consumer can only have
access to a limited number of service providers. The essence of any game is to interact with other players
and get a chance to improve the payoff one gets. To interact with others, one should ﬁrst capture their
attention in a positive manner. When we give our attention to something, we always take it away from
something else. We can think of having attention as owning a kind of property. This property is located
in the memory of a player.
1.3. IPD game under limited attention
In many studies related to IPD game, it is assumed that there exists enough memory to remember all
the previously encountered players and their actions. Memory is an important aspect, because knowing
the identity and history of an opponent allows one to respond in an appropriate manner. We use the
term limited attention to indicate the existence of an upper bound on how many distinct encounters are
remembered by a player. We ask the following reasonable question, as in reference [14], what if the
memory size is limited? The same question can be reformulated as follows: what if attention capacity
is limited? In this study, we introduce attention capacity as an important parameter to investigate the
dynamics of the mentioned game.
2. The model
Researcher Tesfatsion introduced the notions of choice and refusal into IPD games [3]. In order to
choose or refuse an opponent, players should be able to remember the identity of each player and their
past behaviors. It is known that the choice helps players to ﬁnd cooperation while refusal lets them es-
cape from defection [3]. In our very simplistic model, we consider that there exist two type of players:
cooperators, who always cooperate, and defectors, who always defect. We combine these pure strategies
with a simple choice-and-refusal rule: If a player knows that the opponent is a defector, then he or she
refuses to play. Otherwise he or she plays.
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Each round of the IPD game consumes a limited attention of its players. We assume that every player
has the same attention capacity M . When a player encounters an opponent, he stores the necessary in-
formation related to the opponent’s action in his memory. After playing with M different opponent, the
attention capacity ﬁlls up. As the player encounters more opponents, he will have the problem of atten-
tion scarcity. He has to forget the previously encountered ones. To use ones memory eﬃciently, one needs
to decide whom to forget? In this respect, in section 4.1 we will discuss 5 different attention allocation
strategies. Like the rest of the literature, we focus on the conditions under which “cooperative move”
becomes more favorable. However, our research considers that the game takes place in a world with a
limited attention.
The personality of a player (cooperator or defector) is randomly set. Remember that once the person-
ality is set, it never changes. In each iteration, two individuals are randomly chosen to play the game. In
this respect, there is no spatial pattern. One considers that the underlying interaction graph is a complete
graph.
Let C and D denote the sets of cooperator and defector players, respectively. Let N denote the set
of all players, that is, N =C ∪D. The number of defectors is denoted by |D|. Thus, the remaining |C | =
N −|D| players are the cooperators, where N = |N |. We deﬁne our model parameters attention capacity
ratio and defector ratio as µ=M/N and δ= |D|/N , respectively. Hence, we have 0ÉµÉ 1 and 0É δÉ 1.
We use the de facto payoff values of T = 5, R = 3, P = 1, and S = 0 throughout this study.
3. Evaluation metrics
Social welfare can be measured by the average payoff of players. The payoffs of all the encounters
are added up to have the ﬁnal outcome of each player. To make a comparison between the defectors and
the cooperators, we take the average outcome of each. Let ci and di be the numbers of games, where the
player i plays with cooperators and defectors, respectively. We use the payoff matrix given in ﬁgure 1 to
calculate the total payoff of the player i as follows:
payoff(i )=
{
Rci +Sdi , i ∈C ,
T ci +Pdi , otherwise.
We evaluated our results by a comparison between the average performances of the cooperators and the
average performances of the defectors. Our performance metrics are as follows:
P¯C =
1
|C |
∑
i∈C
payoff(i ) and P¯D =
1
|D|
∑
i∈D
payoff(i ).
Although further investigations call for simulations, some analytical investigation of average perfor-
mances is possible.
3.1. Cooperator’s average performance
Cooperator’s average performance of P¯C can be analytically found. For a cooperator, to play with
a defector means no gain, since sucker’s payoff is equal to zero, that is, S = 0. P¯C can only increase if
two cooperators play a round with each other. When two cooperators are selected to play with each
other, each cooperator gets R = 3 points. The probability of matching two cooperators is equal to (1−δ)2.
Among T = τN 2/2 rounds, only (1−δ)2T of them is expected to pass between two cooperators. As a
result, |C | = (1−δ)N cooperators share (R+R)(1−δ)2τN 2/2 payoffs. In other words,
P¯C =
2R(1−δ)2τN
2
2
(1−δ)N
=R(1−δ)τN .
Without any further investigation, we can conclude that increasing τ, N and R is favorable for P¯C while
increasing δ is not. Note that neither attention capacity M nor any attention allocation strategy has effect
in this setting. If the population is composed of only cooperators, that is |C | = N and δ = 0, P¯C will be
RτN .
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3.2. Defector’s average performance
Due to the choice and refusal rule, if an opponent is known to be a defector, no player plays with
him. Therefore, in order to obtain the defector’s average performance of P¯D , we need the probability of
a defector j ∈D to be unknown by player i ∈N . This probability cannot be analytically found except for
the special cases of players without memory and players with unlimited memory.
3.2.1. Players without memory
When players have nomemory, i.e., attention capacity is zero, they are totally forgetful and remember
nothing. Note that this case actually corresponds to a player playing prisoners dilemma without realizing
that they are playing repeatedly. As a result, players continue to play with defectors in spite of the choice
and refusal rule. The probability of matching a defector with a cooperator is equal to 2δ(1−δ) while
matching the two defectors is equal to δ2. Therefore, for a special case of µ= 0, we have
P¯D =
[
T 2δ(1−δ)+2P δ2
]
τN
2
2
δN
= [T (1−δ)+P δ]τN = (5−4δ)τN
for T = 5 and P = 1. We observe that increasing the number of defectors is not favorable even for defec-
tors. Nevertheless, it is easy to verify that for µ= 0, P¯D is always greater than P¯C which can be stated as
defection is a favorable action against the players with no memory.
3.2.2. Players with unlimited memory
For a special case of M Ê N , the players are no longer forgetful and they are able to remember each
opponent’s last action. Due to the choice and refusal system, any defector can play at most |C | rounds
with cooperators and |D|−1 rounds with defectors. Therefore, for a suﬃciently large τ, we have
P¯D = T |C |+P (|D|−1)= (P −T )|D|+T N −P .
We can conclude that as we increase the number of defectors in this setting, the average payoff of the
defectors again decreases.
4. Simulations
The dynamics of a system is further investigated by simulation while the attention capacity ratio µ
and the defectors ratio δ vary. The model is simulated for every possible attention capacity values of M
(from 0 to N ) and for every possible number of defectors (from 0 to N ).We study a population of N = 100.
The number of iterations, T , is another critical issue. It is set to T = τ×N 2/2 since there are
(N
2
)
pairs, where τ, being the third model parameter, is the number of plays for a pair of players. Note that,
when τ= 1, no two players are expected to meet again during the simulation. This situation corresponds
to a non-iterated version of the game. In order to see the effect of time, τ is set to 2 and 5. The results were
averaged over 20 independent realizations for every combination of parameter values.
4.1. Attention allocation strategies
Some people are positive and remember only good memories. On the contrary, some remember bad
events and live to get their revenge. Motivated by these, we make a comparison of 5 simple attention allo-
cation strategies based on forget mechanisms: (i) Players that prefer to forget only cooperators, denoted
by FOC. (ii) Players that prefer to forget only defectors, denoted by FOD. (iii) When players have no pref-
erence, they can select someone, uniformly at random, to forget. We call this strategy as FAR. (iv) Players
may also prefer to use coin ﬂips to decide which type, namely, cooperators or defectors, of a player to
forget. Once the type is decided, someone among this type is randomly selected and forgotten. Let FEQ
denote this “equal probability” to types approach. (iv) If the knowledge of which type has the majority is
available, this extra information can be used in devising a strategy. One possible effective strategy could
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Figure 2. (Color online) Average performances as a function of attention capacity ratio µ and defector ra-
tio δ. The columns represent ﬁve strategies. The rows represent P¯C , P¯D and P¯C −P¯D values, respectively.
be to assume that the opponent is of the type of majority, hence, pay attention to the minorities only. That
is, one prefers to forget the majority which we call FMJ strategy.
We investigate the average performances of cooperators and defectors when they use the same strat-
egy.
5. Observations
In this section, for a more general view, we present our observations based on our simulation data.
With our essential parameters of µ, δ, and τ along with the different attention allocation strategies, we
can determine the conditions under which cooperation is more favorable than defection.
Simulation results for various values of attention capacity ratio µ and defector ratio δ are given in
ﬁgure 2. Columns of ﬁgure 2 correspond to ﬁve strategies. Within a column, the top plot provides the
average performance of cooperators, P¯C , as a function of µ and δ. Similarly, the middle plot gives the
average performance of defectors. The bottom plot is the difference of the averages. Note that being a
cooperator is better when P¯C − P¯D > 0. For the sake of comparison, P¯C − P¯D = 0 curves for different
attention allocation strategies are superposed in ﬁgure 3(b).
5.1. Average performance of cooperators
Findings from the ﬁrst row of ﬁgure 2 are as follows: (i) Interestingly, cooperator’s average payoff does
not signiﬁcantly change neither by attention capacity ratio nor by attention allocation strategy. (ii) How-
ever, the defector ratio has a negative effect on the average performances of cooperators. Our analytical
explanation given in section 3.1 is in agreement with these ﬁndings. For any δ values, P¯C = R(1−δ)τN
gives exactly the same results seen in the ﬁrst row of ﬁgure 2.
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(a) τ= 2 (b) τ= 5
Figure 3. (Color online) Attention boundaries of different allocation strategies are visualized in the same
ﬁgure for the sake of comparison.
5.2. Average performance of defectors
The second row of ﬁgure 2 can be interpreted as follows: (i) Greater attention capacity, i.e., an increase
in µ, helps players to remember the defectors. As a result, defectors experience social isolation and their
average payoff severely diminishes. (ii) An increase in the number of defectors, i.e., an increase in δ,
leads a competition among them. Thus, defectors’ average payoff again diminishes. (iii) Note that all ﬁve
plots are in agreement with our discussion in section 3.2.1 and section 3.2.2 for special cases of µ= 0 and
µ= 1.
5.3. Attention boundaries
We refer to the P¯C−P¯D = 0 contour lines, seen in the third row of ﬁgure 2, as the attention boundaries.
An attention boundary determines a favorable action. If a pair of (µ,δ) remains inside the attention
boundary, it means P¯C − P¯D > 0 and cooperation is a favorable action, otherwise defection is a favorable
action. Attention boundaries for ﬁve different attention allocation strategies seen in ﬁgure 2, are visually
superposed in ﬁgure 3(b) for the sake of comparison.
For a given defector ratio, we observe that there is a critical threshold for attention capacity, be-
low which defection is advantageous, and above which cooperation becomes a favorable action. With
lesser attention capacity, defectors can be easily overlooked. Greater attention capacity along with the
choice-and-refusal rule do not let defectors improve their payoffs. Due to the degrading of defector’s per-
formance, the average payoff of cooperators manages to exceed that of defectors when players have a
greater attention capacity.
5.4. Attention allocation strategies
We consider a strategy better if it has a larger area, where cooperators are doing better than defectors,
in the µ,δ plain. That is, a better strategy has more (µ,δ) pairs below its attention boundary. From this
perspective, the best strategy is FOC, and the worst one is FOD. All the remaining strategies are located in
between these two strategies.
The forget majority, FMJ, is a mixed strategy. When 0.5 < δ, defectors are the majority and FMJ acts
as if they forget only the defectors. When δ < 0.5, cooperators are the majority. Thus FMJ switches to
forget only cooperator. Therefore, its plot is similar to that of FOD for 0 < δ < 0.5 and that of FOC for
0.5 < δ < 1. FMJ strategy can be put differently as allocation of the minority. One can think that this
strategy is better than the rest, since scarcity, in general, triggers the perception of greater importance.
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Nevertheless, ﬁgure 3(b) is against this intuition. The optimal strategy is to forget only the cooperators.
By doing so, players manage to allocate their memories only for defectors. In other words, they keep
their enemies closer. Thus, they become more prudent to the defectors. On the other hand, forgetting
defectors seems to be the most wasteful and carefree attention consuming habit. We observe that the
necessary information for refusing the defectors is dismissed while applying the FOD strategy.
The critical value of δ= 0.5 determines which strategy is superior, except for the two extreme strate-
gies of FOD and FOC. FEQ does better than FAR when 0.5< δ and FAR does better than FEQ when δ< 0.5.
Even if FAR strategy seems identical to FEQ strategy, there exists a slight difference between them. Notice
that, forgetting at random depends on the content of the memory, while forgetting with equal probability
does not. Higher defector’s ratio, that is 0.5 < δ, causes one to encounter more defectors. In that case,
memories of the players would be plentiful with defective experiences. Thus, forgetting at randomwould
be more biased towards FOD. Similarly, forgetting at random would be more biased towards FOC when
δ< 0.5.
5.5. Effect of time
Literature on IPD game suggests that as the number of iterations increases, the cooperative behavior
also increases among the players [2, 10]. This is also veriﬁed by our simulations. The shadow of the future
can be quantiﬁed by the parameter of τ. A short shadow of the future (lesser τ), hinders the detection
of the defectors. When the future of the shadow is longer, lesser attention capacity would be suﬃcient
for cooperators to beat the defectors. As τ increases, defector’s performance gets worse in comparison
with cooperators. Attention boundaries obtained by setting τ = 2 and τ = 5 are given in ﬁgure 3(a) and
ﬁgure 3(b), respectively. The area inside the attention boundaries is much larger in ﬁgure 3(b) than in
ﬁgure 3(a). This ﬁnding suggests that the shadow of the future fosters cooperation.
6. Conclusions
We observe that as the proportion of the defectors increases, the average payoff for any player de-
creases. On the other hand, an increase in the attention capacity has different outcomes for cooperators
and defectors. As attention capacity increases, the change in the cooperators overall performance is al-
most negligible, but the defectors’ performance signiﬁcantly diminishes. The rule of choice-and-refusal
plays an important role in this situation. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that even the choice-and-
refusal alone cannot fulﬁll the desired goal without passing some threshold value of attention capacity.
As the attention capacity increases, or the shadow of the future gets longer, the detection of the defectors
gets feasible, consequently the defectors face a social isolation due to the rule of choice-and-refusal. As
a result, the cooperators’ performance exceeds the defectors’ performance. Thus, cooperation becomes
a favorable action. This work demonstrates that in order to beat a defection, players do not need a full
memorization of each action of all opponents. This ﬁnding is really important especially in the world of a
limited attention. We also investigate ﬁve different attention allocation strategies andwe ﬁnd out that the
best strategy is “forgetting only the cooperators”. By applying this strategy, one becomes more prudent to
the deceptive actions. In conclusion, attention should be selective, and it should be directed towards the
defectors and towards their defective moves.
In the present work, players are pure cooperators or pure defectors. They never change their charac-
ter. Various forgetting strategies are investigated but both cooperators and defectors use the same strat-
egy in a game. The situation of cooperators using one strategy and defectors another is left for the future
work. It would be also interesting to study the effect of a biased payoff matrix. As a future work, we
plan to investigate other means for fostering cooperation, even in the conditions of attention scarcity. To
achieve this goal, we can make use of other experiences by taking recommendations to determine with
whom to play. But from whom to take advice is very critical and must be well studied to clarify which
collaboration strategy is better. Wewill also extend our work to the mixed strategies for interaction, such
as “mostly defect” and “mostly cooperate”.
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Iтерована дилема в’язня з обмеженою увагою
У. Сетiн1,2, Г.O. Бiнгол1
1 Факультет комп’ютерної iнженерiї, Унiверситет Богазiчi, Стамбул, Туреччина
2 Факультет комп’ютерної iнженерiї, Стамбульський унiверситет Гелiсiм, Стамбул, Туреччина
Як дефiцит уваги впливає на результати гри? Ми представляємо нашi результати на прикладi гри Iтерова-
на дилема в’язня (Iterated Prisoners Dilemma (IPD)), в якiй гравцi можуть погоджуватися чи вiдмовлятися
грати зi своїм партнером. Ми вивчаємо вплив розмiру пам’ятi на визначення вiдповiдного партнера для
взаємодiї. Ми дослiджуємо умови, при яких ймовiрнiше стати партнерами нiж перебiжчиками. Ця робота
демонструє, що для перемоги над дезертирством гравцi не потребують повного запам’ятовування кожної
дiї всiх опонентiв. Для того, щоб перемогти перебiжчикiв iснує критичний порiг здатностi уваги. Цей порiг
залежить не тiльки вiд частки перебiжчикiв в популяцiї, але також вiд стратегiї розподiлу уваги гравцiв.
Ключовi слова: дефiцит уваги, взаємодiя, вплив розмiру пам’ятi, iтерована дилема в’язня, соцiальнi та
економiчнi моделi
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